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Abstract: - Nuclear safety governance should move towards a more robust regime including elements of international monitoring 
and verification. This is needed because nuclear energy production is likely to grow and new reactors will have different global 
dispersal, veering towards less experienced countries. In addition, there is growing interest in international and multilateral 
collaboration on disposal of mounting nuclear waste. Unlike existing improvements that came in response to nuclear disasters (by 
accident), it makes sense to implement all these elements at once (by design). While a comprehensive global governance regime 
must include elements of verification and enforcement, more transparent international oversight would also improve global nuclear 
safety through public pressure. The monitoring and enforcement of such a globally organized regime could be introduced at 
regional or otherwise supranational level. In this paper, we argue that a robust global nuclear safety regime is not only necessary 
but also feasible provided it manages to address the following potential hurdles: i) the tensions in international security politics, ii) 
the stickiness of national sovereignty and iii) industry resistance to additional restrictions and to issues of proprietary commercial 
information. These objections will be elaborately reviewed in the paper. 
Key Words: - Nuclear energy, Nuclear power, Nuclear safety, Nuclear accidents, Global governance of safety.
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been more than four years since an earthquake and 
tsunami caused an accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant in Japan resulting in repeated fires and three 
reported core meltdowns. At the latest count, the accident had 
caused $166 billion in damages1 [1] and at least 573 
immediate deaths from the evacuation, along with hundreds 
of future deaths related to cancer anticipated to occur [2]. 
Somewhat sweeping industry reforms were called for, and 
public acceptance of the technology plummeted [3]. 
Supporters of nuclear power were quick to point out that a 
complete phase out would complicate efforts at mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector [4] and 
could lead to cumulative global losses in global gross 
domestic product [5]. The March 2011 Fukushima nuclear 
accident is a poignant reminder that disasters of enormous 
consequences can occur in the nuclear industry. But how often 
and with what severity? These two questions constitute the 
core of sound risk management, which requires identifying 
and quantifying such potential losses and their frequencies. 
For most natural and human-made catastrophes such as 
earthquakes, meteorites, avalanches, mountain collapses, 
forest fires, hurricanes, epidemics, health care costs, war 
sizes, terrorist intensities, cyber risks, dam failures, industrial 
disasters, and so on, plentiful historical data has allowed 
scientists and engineers to determine the distributions of 
losses. 
II. METHODS 
There are many ways to quantify the risk of accidents in 
nuclear energy systems. The Farmer curve is one of the 
standard tools of nuclear risk assessment, with the risk defined 
as “probability × consequences” [20]. Typical Farmer plots 
display the annual frequency of fatalities or of property 
damage from human made sources of risk. Remarkably, the 
nuclear risks reported in Farmer plots are fundamentally 
different from all previously mentioned risks, in that the 
distributions for nuclear event losses are always thin-tailed 
and Gaussian-like, presenting a downward concave shape in 
the standard log–log representation. 
The appearance of the Soviet Union’s Chernobyl accident in 
1986 and of Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant 
accident, after the tsunami on 11 March, 2011, seem at odds 
with the statistics implied by the Farmer curves. Actually, 
following the Chernobyl accident, Hsu [17] and Sengor [18], 
[19] suggested a different approach, based on the reasoning 
that the number of fatalities is an incomplete, if not 
misleading, metric for measuring nuclear losses given the 
difficulties in assessing long term real mortality in addition to 
early morbidity and mortality. Indeed, this metric misses 
many other dimensions and also prevents quantitative 
comparisons. Hsu in particular made the point that the 
statistical analysis of earthquake risks, for instance, would 
have missed the fundamental Gutenberg–Richter magnitude–
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frequency law [21] if seismologists had focused on only the 
few large earthquakes. By considering a range of event sizes 
above which the data is known to be sufficiently complete, or 
at least representative, one can identify possible statistical 
regularities that are relevant to the largest events. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY GOALS  
The General Nuclear Safety Objective is to establish and 
maintain an effective radiation protection measures in nuclear 
power plant, in order to protect staff, the public and the 
environment from radioactive hazards [1]. This general 
nuclear safety objective is supported by two complementary 
safety objectives: radiation protection and technical aspects.  
Radiation Protection Objective is to ensure that the radiation 
exposure within the nuclear power plant when it is in the 
operation or the radiation exposure from any planned release 
of the nuclear power plant radioactive material maintain 
below prescribed limits and as low as reasonably achievable, 
and to ensure that mitigate any radiological consequences of 
the accident. This objective is based on the protection of staff, 
public health and environmental safety. Technical Safety 
Objective is to take all reasonably practicable measures to 
prevent accidents in nuclear installations and in the event of 
an accident to mitigate its consequences. When design the 
nuclear power plant, all possible accidents should have 
considered. It includes a low probability of accidents. It 
should make sure with the high credibility that any 
radiological consequences are as minor as possible and below 
the prescribed limits.  There is extremely low probability 
occurrence of serious radiological consequences of the 
accident. The purpose of establishing a safety goal could not 
eliminate risk, but it could help control the risk. In order to 
promote nuclear power plant operation achieves high safety 
standards in effective way and make the risk from operational 
states to levels as low as reasonably achievable. 
IV.  PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE 
Public acceptance research is a cross research theme of 
technology and public administration. It is an interaction 
subject between public and technical. The aim is to alleviate 
the potential conflict between technological development and 
social development ultimately by studying the characteristics 
of public risk awareness [5].  At present, the approach of 
spreading public opinion has been very different from that 
previous in China. More and more public can access the 
variety of anti-nuclear opinion through the Internet, television 
broadcast and other media. Implementation of a series of the 
system such as hearings and open legislation makes the public 
participate in social affairs frequently, and the government 
will widely have consulted and adopt the public opinion 
during the decision-making process. As the public acceptance 
would have a more direct impact on the development of 
Chinese nuclear power, two aspects “the main factors 
affecting public acceptance” and “the impact of public 
acceptance on the development of nuclear power” will be 
studied in the following. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Through the discussion with public acceptance of nuclear 
energy and the nuclear power safety goals, it can be found that 
the public acceptance effects the development and the safety 
goals establishment of the nuclear power. Meanwhile the 
nuclear power safety goals directly influence the public 
attitude towards the nuclear power. Relative to the safety 
goals, the public prefers the defence-in-depth safety principles 
[9]. Therefore, the defence-in-depth safety principles should 
be considered in the safety goal establishment. The answer to 
the question “How safe is safe enough” should be contained 
in the safety goal establishment. In this way, the safety goals 
could be easily acceptable by the public. According to the 
study of the Chernobyl accident, the public concern about 
environmental impacts of nuclear power plants, the public 
wants nuclear power not to affect the living environment. It 
could be better to contain the land pollution in the nuclear 
safety goals.  Due to the complexity of the nuclear power 
technology, it is difficult for the public to recognize the 
mechanism of the nuclear power risk. Thus the establishment 
of the safety goals should be easier to understand for the 
public. The public could involve in the assessment of the 
safety goals and help improve it. In the nuclear power 
technology development, the safety goals should be adjusted 
timely according to the actual circumstances.  It could help to 
improve the safety of the nuclear power. The nuclear power 
could be accepted and supported. 
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